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Changes that derive from financial liberalisation in a competitive 
environment constitute one of the major points of discussion in the debate on 
European Integration. The aim of this paper is to establish a topology of the 
existing banking systems in order to discuss the position of universal banks.
The first section presents the similarities and differences between 
European countries and describes how evolution towards a unified banking 
system will be possible. Section 2 gives an overview of the arguments in favour 
of universal banks. Section 3 critically evaluates these arguments. In particular 
the predominance of universal banks over any other form of institution is tested. 
The last section concludes by considering the future position of universal banks. 
One option could be a more adequate equilibrium between banking institutions 
in order to preserve the potential advantages of universal banks without being 






















































































































































































Changes that derive from financial liberalisation in a competitive 
environment constitute one of the major points of discussion in the debate on 
European Integration. The European financial area offers several freedoms: 
freedom of establishment, freedom of capital circulation and freedom of 
provision of financial services. In this context what will European banking look 
like tomorrow? The aim of this paper is to establish a topology of the existing 
banking systems in order to discuss the position of universal banks. The first 
section presents the similarities and differences between European countries and 
describes how evolution towards a unified banking system will be possible.
The role of universal banks in the context of European integration is 
analysed subsequently. As European regulation privileges the size criterion, the 
core of the discussion is first a review of the increasing concentration in banking 
which is taking place not only at an internal level (inside each member country) 
but also at a Community level. The situation in different member countries will 
be presented to demonstrate the advantages and disadvantages of a compact 
banking system.
We go on to give an overview of the arguments in favour of universal 
banks. In particular we consider whether the power of these banks might present 
a threat to the stability of the European banking system.
1/ Different banking systems
Universal banks can be understood as organisational structures which 
maintain close relationships between firms and their financiers in order to 
guarantee a regular source of capital. The best model is given by the German 
Grossbanken which developed a consultancy arm, the aim of which was to 
collect the information needed to evaluate correctly the financial risks of the 
projects proposed by the enterprises. As early as the nineteenth century, the 
Berliner banks used to place a member of the bank on the Shareholders’ Board 
in order to exert a monitoring role. This particular situation can be compared to 
that of other countries in the same period, such as France, Italy and Spain. Such 
a comparison leads to the following conclusions:
- the universal bank did not exist in France; the banking system was composed 
of specialised and deposit banks. As a rule credit institutions were not 
represented in Shareholders’ Assemblies.
- Italy remained a unique example: government policy and Central bank 
intervention in the case of liquidity or solvency problems could be considered 




























































































Nowadays, the opposition between universal and specialised banks still exists 
and refers to the set of services provided by the institution.
The universal bank can undertake all kinds of banking activities at national and 
regional level. These banks exist in Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, 
Greece and Luxembourg.
The specialised institution aims to concentrate on the provision of a small range 
of products and covers a large variety of establishments with respect to both size 
and the nature of activity.
Whilst the process of deregulation in the 1980s has reduced the extent of the 
differences between these two modes of functioning, important structural 
disparities still remain. Hence, the "Anglo-Saxon family" is characterised by the 
dominance of the market in financial intermediation and by the specialisation of 
banking institutions not only in the United Kingdom but also in Ireland and 
Denmark. The "Latin family" includes all the systems where financial 
intermediation is traditionally strong and where bank specialisation is a long 
established fact (France, Spain) or a more recent one (Portugal, Italy).
1/ Why such a differentiation of banking systems?
Alfred Steinherr and Christian Huveneers in an article entitled "On the 
performance of differently regulated financial institutions: some empirical 
evidence" summarize the disparities in European banking systems by 
distinguishing two types of institutional functioning: the first is based on the 
logic of the market (denoted system M), the other is based on the logic of 
banking (denoted system B). The latter embraces the position of universal banks 
(denoted BU).
According to these authors financial structures are determined principally 
by national regulation. Such an affirmation leads to the following question: why 
do regulation policies differ from one country to another? Beyond the historical 
elements, important factors will be the place of financial markets, the economic 
role of the government and the public sector and the degree of economic 
development. The table in Annex A on bank structures illustrates these 
differences. There appear to be two opposing blocs: on one side, the 
Anglo-Saxon bloc where financial markets are more developed and government 
intervention less common: on the other side, the countries where banks have a 
predominant position and where regulation often signifies protection. The states 
which have universal banks must be considered separately: these pursue more 
macroeconomic objectives. They act in conjunction with the government policy. 





























































































However, the essential elements which define the disparities between 
European countries seem to be the evaluation of risk and the monitoring role 
highlighted in the table on performance. These two concepts are a product of the 
asymmetric information which exists between borrower and lender. The B 
system is relational;1 it produces information through a regular relationship 
between the lender and the borrower. If, in addition, the banker is a shareholder 
of the borrower,2 the long term relationship is reinforced and leads to a better 
appreciation of risk.
The relationships between banks and their clients are then based on the 
private information held by trade debtors. This implies the transfer of 
information that the firm could share with all its creditors. This specificity 
opposes the B system to the M system. In the latter, infonnation is made public 
through particular organisations (consulting firms) whose role is to collect and 
evaluate informative elements. The universal banks combine the two systems 
giving them a relative advantage as regards risk diversification and the 
monitoring power they exert on their clients.
In sum the universal bank model possesses a greater aptitude for the 
collection of information (the banks operating directly through representation on 
the Shareholders board), enabling them better to manage financial risks by a 
higher level of asset diversification.
2/ How to realize a unified banking system ?
The financial diversity of European countries has led the European 
Commission to propose legislative directives in order to realise the unification 
of the banking system. Our purpose here is to present this legislation and to 
examine its implications.
The principal text, the Second Banking Directive of 1989, aimed to 
establish by 1992 a uniform internal market and to solve the problems left over 
by the First Banking Directive (1977). Its fundamental contribution was the 
establishment of the principle of unique license in banking questions. This 
license enables each credit institution to set up in any member country. Annex 
B lists the services that can be offered in every host country. These are identical 
to those offered by universal banks. A deregulation process was therefore 
required for countries in which a distinction between a universal bank and 
specialised bank had been strictly applied, in order to bring them into line with
1 cf. Alfred Steinherr and Christian Huveneers 1992 p. 7.
2 Universal banks generally participate in the enterprises they finance cf. Jeremy Edwards 




























































































the position chosen by the Commission. This will be examined in the next 
section.
What then is the procedure by which a bank can set up operations in 
another member state of the EEC? The authorities of the home country have 
first to approve the institution’s proposals and the adequacy of its structures. 
When agreement is reached, they transfer the information to the host country 
and authorise establishment. This implies strong cooperation between banking 
authorities and reciprocity agreements for all partners.
Elowever, the directive has several limits. In particular, it does not succeed 
in abolishing entry barriers nor in reducing the hurdle of bureaucratic 
requirements. The host country can impose a three month delay before allowing 
a bank to undertake its activity. In addition, three further months can be required 
before the home country makes a final decision as regards the proposal and 
transfers the relevant information to the competent authorities. Moreover, the 
Second Directive, by granting a monitoring role to the host country, partially 
maintains entry barriers. These rules, which are generally imposed in order to 
protect the consumer, are applied differently across member countries and no 
harmonisation is envisaged (cf. Dermine (1993)).
Various rules have been established to protect depositors. The Directive 
on Equity Capital (1989) aims to harmonise the definition of the equity ratio in 
order to facilitate the comparison of prudential ratios for European banks. The 
Directive on Solvency Ratios aims to establish a minimum solvency level for all 
institutions in the Community. A ratio is then calculated between equity capital 
and risky assets with different levels of risk attributed to each class of these 
assets. The equity capital must in addition cover a set of requirements regarding:
- market risk on negotiation portfolio:3 this includes essentially the risk resulting 
from variation in asset prices
- exchange risk.
Within these categories can be distinguished specific risk or risk generated by 
a variation in price related to the issue of the asset, and general risk defined as 
the risk of a price variation generated by a fluctuation in interest rate, in the case 
of claims, or by a general movement in asset prices.
The requirement of equity capital relative to general risk is determined by the 
application of a coefficient of 8% to the net global position.4
3 The negotiation portfolio is principally represented by transactions in assets (cf. the 
Journal Officiel de la République Française of September 28th 1995 alinéa 5).
4 The net position represents the buyer account (or net long position ) or the bear account 
(short net position) o f the operations registered by the establishment on each asset or 




























































































The requirement of equity capital relative to specific risk is determined by 
applying a coefficient of 4% to the gross global position.
Exchange rate risk must be covered by equity capital as soon as the global net 
position in currency exceeds 2% of total equity capital .
Finally, in order to prevent a credit institution from accumulating an 
unacceptable level of risk with a single client or group of clients, the 
Commission published a Recommendation regarding Control and Supervision at 
the start of 1987. Each institution has to provide an annual report to the relevant 
authorities giving details on risky commitments even if they represent less than 
15% of equity capital.
Additional documents aim at ensuring the protection of the clients in their 
dealing with the credit establishments. To this end one can distinguish:
- a directive on consumption credit (adopted in December 1986, applicable since 
January 1st 1990), the aim of which was essentially to eliminate distortions in 
competition due to disparities in national regulations;
- a recommendation on deposits, which imposed a guarantee system for deposits 
in all member states, with respect to minima criteria.
In general these regulations express the position of the Commission 
regarding the establishment of a new type of bank very close to the universal 
bank. They will, without doubt, provoke profound changes in the different 
national systems. All EEC members intend to prevent the type of solvency or 
liquidity risk which can penalise depositors. However preventive measures are 
not applied uniformly across the European Union. This will be discussed now.
3/ The modifications provoked by the new European "regulation"
Europe is actually at the intersection of two opposing tendencies:
- a logic of convergence expressed by the European Commission which aims to 
install a unique banking market;
- a logic of divergence which maintains the disparities between the different 
banking systems (as they already exist in the member countries).
The arguments that follow will first discuss the transformations provoked by the 
new regulations. Then a critical analysis of the legislation’s application will be 
presented in order to illustrate the "perverse effects" which arise from the 
establishment of a unified banking area.
Annex C describes the changes in regulation that have occurred since 1980 in 
Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, Italy and the Netherlands. In the 1970s some 
regulation was applied. However, restrictions have always been very limited in 
Germany, intended only to establish a clear separation between banking services 




























































































control the activities of building societies. Spain and Belgium possessed 
important functional cleavages and some specialised institutions.
The deregulation movement which took place in the 1980s can be 
summarised as follows. Three countries, Germany, the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands have experienced deregulation in a fairly unrestrictive legislative 
context. Globally no strong transformation can be noted in Germany or the 
Netherlands, although in the latter the functional separation between commercial 
banks and investment banks has progressively disappeared.
In contrast Italy has followed a cautious evolutionary path. Having begun 
by promoting the model of the pluri-functional bank (with the "Amato" law) in 
a more universal objective (as described in the Second Directive), it has now 
slowed down the rate of change because of profitability losses.5
Between these two extreme cases, Belgium, France and Spain have 
undertaken serious processes of deregulation. Spain has despecialised its system 
and has promoted an orientation towards universal banks. In France, the 
distinction between deposit and investment banks is gradually disappearing, 
giving way to institutions with more diversified activities.
As previously mentioned, three banking families still coexist in Europe. 
The new regulations attempt to eliminate these disparities in order to realise 
unified internal market. The question is how the Second Directive could lead to 
a more competitive situation with a wider variety of activities for banking 
institutions.
The Second Directive in recognizing the home country’s supremacy as 
regards the establishment of a bank, allows a surprising degree of discrimination: 
a branch of a foreign bank, authorised in a Community country where 
regulations are more liberal than in the host country, benefits from an advantage 
over local banks in that it can produce or take part in activities not accessible 
to the latter. It is forbidden for example for Belgian or Italian banks to 
participate directly in industrial companies. But, in the same countries, a branch 
of an authorised German bank (where these restrictions do not apply) can so 
participate, and in doing so gain an advantage over national banks. Similarly, 
British banks, which can intervene directly on the asset markets at home can 
proceed in the same way in France where such practices are forbidden.
Such disadvantageous circumstances for the host country should disappear 
with the interaction of market forces. It is expected that the national systems will
5 For more details see the article of Angelo Baglioni Banca Universale, Gruppo 





























































































slowly converge to the universality model annihilating national differences and 
allowing all the benefit from the free provision of financial services.
However, legislative deregulation on its own is not sufficient to reach the 
model of universality. Considerations regarding market position and size are 
necessary if credit institutions are to become comparable to German ones. 
Banking concentration at the national and Community level is essential to reach 
a model competitive with respect to countries where very powerful banks exist 
(eg. the United States and Japan).
II/ European Integration: the roie of universal banks in the financial system
As mentioned earlier, the new banking legislation promotes universal 
banks more capable of standing up to foreign competition. To reach this 
objective, the simplest solution during the 1990s decade has been to increase the 
size of banking institutions, which is the reflection of power and flexibility. 
European integration cannot be separated from a movement towards 
concentration, which leads to the following questions:
- does this concentration mean a real increase in banking power?
- given that this process will reinforce the position of the more powerful
banks, is it efficient for the European banking system?
In particular the position of some EEC partners in facing this evolution will be 
discussed. The predominance of universal banks will then be critically analysed.
1/ The problem of increasing concentration
Annex D reproduces a non-exhaustive list of domestic and 
infra-Community concentration over the last decade. Despite differences with 
respect to establishments, each banking system possesses a strong core of 
institutions recognised by the proper authorities and the public sector.6 The 
question is whether the size of banking companies is becoming significant. 
Annex D (point B) shows that domestic acquisitions and mergers are initiated 
by dominant banks. Which criteria do these credit institutions follow when 
signing their contracts?
6 For example, in the United Kingdom the core includes Barclays, National Westminster, 
Midland and Lloyds; in France the Crédit Agricole, the B.N.P., the Crédit Lyonnais, the 
Société Générale and Paribas; in Italy the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, the Institute Bancario 
Sao Paolo, the Monte dei Paschi di Siena; and in Germany the Deutsche Bank, the Dresdner 




























































































If we consider the inside market two criteria are predominant. The first 
concerns the conditions of competition and consequently the access to a higher 
level of performance. In particular, a larger size implies an increase in market 
power and greater gains from economies of scale, if one can afford to invest the 
necessary capital to realise the acquisitions or mergers. As a result Europe will 
not become a perfectly competitive banking market place, as was intended for 
1992. The immediate consequence is rather the reinforcement of monopoly 
forces, which already exist. In countries where concentration is low (eg. Spain 
and Portugal, where the banking system was characterised, until recently, by a 
greater fragmentation) this movement was necessary in order to face competition 
not only in Europe but also at an international level. The existence of 
agreements between banks tends to prove a preference for risk control rather 
than an emphasis on competition.7
Secondly, the increase of size in the banking sector makes possible a 
wider market diversification not only at a geographical level but also at a 
sector-based level. If we look at the way in which classical universal banks 
function, it seems that their market power enables them to set up subsidiaries in 
several regions.8 Moreover, their innovative capacity with respect to products 
and techniques gives them the opportunity to adapt to multiple financial 
activities.9 These innovative processes nevertheless require that the costs 
suffered in the short term lead to substantial profits in the long term. This is the 
basic argument for concentration of banking establishments inside each member 
country.
The transition towards concentration among the different partners induces 
in addition technology transfers (import and export) in order to satisfy the needs 
of the host market.
This movement towards a more compact banking system in the hands of 
increasingly powerful companies seems a necessary condition for European 
unification. An interesting question is whether this orientation is perceived 
favourably by all European members.
7 For more detail see the article by Heather D. Gibson and Euclid Tsakalotos, "European 
Integration and Banking in Southern Europe: Competition, Efficiency and Structure" 
KETMENA 1992.
8 The German Grossbanken are represented in each Land.




























































































2/ National reactions towards deregulation: the Scandinavian position
In the first section it was pointed out that some European partners have 
a tradition of distinction between specialised and universal banks. In 
Scandinavian countries in particular, these larger banks (as regards size and 
market power) are rare. We wonder whether the present legislative context will 
oblige them to create these institutions ex nihilo. As an example let us cite 
Denmark and Norway in which the absence of these large banks is most notable. 
For these two countries the new regulations constitute a serious barrier to the 
future integration of their banking industries and explain the opposition of the 
monetary and government authorities towards such changes. While in most 
European countries, the economies of scope are almost reached, Scandinavia 
must undertake a continuous process of banking concentration10 1before the 
levels of competitiveness required by European standards are satisfied. 
Ironically, in practice, mergers and banking agreements have been rare: the most 
notable ones are those which took place between the Finnish institution 
Kansallis-Osake-Pankki and the Swedish bank G-Kabanken. One ought not to 
over-estimate this phenomenon. It is well known that the Danish and Norwegian 
economies have faced stagnation in the last few years while Sweden and Finland 
have benefited from high rates of investment and growth. However, the small 
number of contracts signed could be a sign of resistance to fundamental change 
in countries not prepared for the "foundation" of universal banks like the 
German ones.
Internal financial crises (eg. the banking failures that occurred in the 
1980s) are also a source of the problem. The most famous bankruptcy was that 
of Kronebanken A/S, the fourth biggest bank in Denmark, which resulted from 
a merger between two existing banks. After political intervention a second 
collusion with the Den Danske Provinsbank occurred. None of the depositors 
lost any capital but the State promised that a guarantee fund would be 
established despite the opposition of the banking organisations. This failed 
alliance was not without its influence on the lack of enthusiasm for the 
concentration of banking. At the beginning of 1987 a more modest 
establishment, the Sixth July Bank was forced to close by the banking authorities 
for reasons which remained obscure. Afterwards the Guarantee Funds were 
established by law in application of the European directives."
10 Denmark is considered to be the country with the largest extension of banking services 
in Europe (cf. Lyck (1990)).
11 For more detail see the Réglement n°95-01 of 21st July 1995 relative to the guarantee 




























































































The Swedish case must be considered separately from that of the other 
Scandinavian countries: its banking system is quite concentrated and includes 
universal institutions. Four establishments dominate the market: Skandinaska 
Enskilda Bank, PK Banken, Swedbank and Svenska Handelsbank (in December 
1989 the PK Banken merged with the Nordbanken, the most profitable bank in 
Sweden). The new banking regulations appear better adapted to Sweden than to 
Scandinavia as a whole.
Despite some resistance and divergent opinions on the concentration 
process (due to the presence of a very fragmented banking system) Scandinavian 
countries are committed to deregulation. In contrast to European partners, 
however, economists and responsible authorities (cf. Gardener (1989) and Lyck 
(1990)) have expressed reservations about the integration process. An overview 
of the question is presented below in order to analyse the difficulty resulting 
from the foundation of a unified banking system.
3/ The advantages and limits of a banking system dominated by the 
Universal Banks
The predominance of universal banks calls for a definition of European 
banking activities. Universal banks exert simultaneously the lender’s and the 
shareholder’s role for their societies. This point is studied by Aoki (1994) in the 
Japanese context and leads to two main conclusions. Bankers fix their mixed 
strategy of investment (as lender and shareholder) so that they maximise net 
income. However, their participation as holders of assets generates a level of 
debt over and above the level required to optimise the value of the firm. This 
solution is preferable for the bank for which the loss due to an under-evaluation 
of assets is largely compensated by an over-credit with a higher interest rate. 
Secondly, the bank which is both lender and shareholder bears part of the 
industrial risk and as such influences the industrial decisions of societies in 
which it has an interest. This scenario, while essentially valid for Japan, is also 
effective for most European countries. According to the conventional wisdom 
these practices improve profitability for the lenders. The question is then 
whether this increase in profitability is the only phenomenon associated with 
universal banks. The actual context tends to reduce the demarcation between 
commercial and investment activities for all credit establishments. The 
regulations focus essentially on solvency and liquidity risk and not on market 
interest rate risk (cf section I point 2). As regards the universal banks, this 
distinction becomes totally inappropriate. For the commercial banks the objective 
is to control solvency and liquidity risks while investment banks are concentrated 
on position and market risk. Universal banks will be in position to take into 
consideration these two factors together and to consolidate their place in the 




























































































However, concentration in favour of the most powerful organisms 
produces inconveniences for the system as a whole. The first relates to the 
excessive emphasis on profit which can generate financial disequilibria. Two 
essential factors of instability can be envisaged. The excessive emphasis on 
profit from the bank’s and shareholders’ point of view can imply risky 
investments. An incautious attitude adopted in order to gain control rapidly over 
large parts of the market can lead to crisis situations which are only controllable 
by a counter-power as the lender of the last resort. The second factor of 
instability regards the danger of distortions in competition in relation to non 
financial intermediaries and to more modest banks.
As regards these different arguments it is possible to consider that 
concentration may increase efficiency in the European system if risks are 
properly controlled. In other words, is size a relevant criterion for the European 
banking system?
Ill/ Are Size, Universality and Efficiency necessarily correlated?
This section is devoted to the evaluation of the advantages offered by 
universal banks in order to examine if this is the best option for the unified 
market. A critical analysis of all or some of the effects provoked by deregulation 
will enable us to evaluate the impact of universal banks on European banking 
system.
1/ Are universal banks more profitable for the European banking system?
A number of proponents of universal banks have based their arguments 
on the capacity of these institutions to acquire reliable information on solvency 
and liquidity risk. The cost induced by this activity is smaller than that which 
would have be faced by a specialised credit establishment. This condition is 
considered as necessary and sufficient to maintain the global cohesion of the 
system.12 However, this advantage seems to have been over-estimated. When 
placed in a European perspective, the differences between the performance of 
specialised and non specialised establishments are less significant. In particular,
12 For more detail see: Alfred Steinherr and Christian Huveneers (1990): "Universal 
Banks: The Prototype of Successful Banks in the Integrated European Market? A view 
inspired by German Experience", Working Paper Centre for European Policy Studies; Jeremy 





























































































debt contracts do not translate to a strong differentiation in interest rates, as 
might be expected.13
If universal banks did benefit from informational superiority, the latter 
would be reflected in a higher level of performance.14 However this advantage 
is not easily evaluated (Cable (1985, p. 121). Cable aims to simulate the 
repercussions that would be generated if a bank representative were to participate 
as an entreprise shareholder in the British banking system, as is done in 
Germany. The conclusion is the following: the combination of credit allocation 
and supervision leads to good performances for the bank and the enterprise. But 
it is difficult to isolate which factor prevails. This form of participation 
introduced into the British model would imply a transition from short term 
relations to longer ones.
Turning to the question of economies of scale, many financial specialists 
consider that size can contribute positively to good performance in three ways: 
through lower administration costs, through an increase in the intermediation 
techniques allowed by higher level of innovation research, and through reduced 
costs of commercialisation (the idea being that consumer recognition of a 
product is a function of size and constitutes an important determinant of sales 
(cf. Gardener (1989)). Prais (1981) insists that size enables a reduction in the 
variability of company incomes.15 Moreover Clark (1988) fails to prove the 
hypothesis that economies of scale are relevant for the banking sector. His 
conclusion is that the latter are only significant for deposit institutions of small 
size (representing less than 100 million Dollars US as total deposit). Muldur, 
Sassenou et Pacolet (1989) add that the biggest establishments benefit from 
economies of scale which are in part counterbalanced by diseconomies of the 
same nature (eg. higher costs of R&D...). This factor is not then best adapted to 
justify an orientation towards a "German" banking system.
13 Alfred Steinherr and Christian Huveneers (1992b) state in part :
"Doubts about universal banks’ informational superiority are, however raised by performance 
comparisons. If  the information superiority of universal banks as compared to commercial 
banks, was really significant, then one should be able to observe at least one of the following 
differences in loan contracts: loans granted by universal banks should exhibit greater 
differentiation in risk premiums, lower default ratios or credit with longer maturities" (p. 52).
14 Cable (1985) remarks that placing a bank representative on the Board of Shareholders 
of an enterprise, confers to the lender an informational advantage leading to a more efficient 
control of the investment activities. Prais (1981) observes in this regard that this internal 
supervision acts as a consulting agency paid for by the shareholders.




























































































The last point is the criterion of risk diversification. The literature analyses 
this concept through the definition of the debt contract between a bank and an 
enterprise. A situation of adverse selection exists generally between these two 
partners (cf. Deshon and Freixas (1987), Laffont and Freixas (1988), Gale and 
Hellwig (1984), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)) caused by an asymmetric information 
regarding the project to be undertaken. This hypothesis leads the bank to prefer 
credit rationing to the realisation of an equilibrium between demand and supply 
at a specific interest rate.16 The agency relationship between a bank and a firm 
prevents the lender from distinguishing sound creditor risks from bad ones. 
The requirement of a guarantee can solve such problems and enables the lender 
to separate good borrowers from bad ones. In this context Freixas-Deshon 
(1987) establish two types of loan systems:
- the optimal separating contracts, where good credit risks are identified
- the credit rationing solution, where neither guarantee nor interest rate make 
selection possible since the bank is unable to take the surplus of its loan 
customers.
Credit establishments constitute then a portfolio of participation in the different 
societies so that they minimise financial risk. It is often suggested that universal 
banks reach such a level of diversification that they can maintain a higher level 
of stability. Jordi Canals (1993) has constructed a regression to verify the 
correlation between size and asset revenue for a sample of 24 American banks. 
He proves that this relation is negative and that the most profitable banks are the 
smallest ones.17 Alfred Steinherr and Christian Huveneers (1992b) give us a 
hypothesis test of stability, comparing the differences in the means and variances 
of profits between the largest banks of certain European countries and the whole 
banking sector in the same countries for the 1980. They doubt that size is an 
essential criterion for reaching a higher level of performance through a wider 
diversification of assets. The results of this test are reported in the table below.
16 Stiglitz and Weiss (1988) state in part:
" As a consequence, as the bank raises the rate of interest, there is an adverse selection effect: 
the mix of loans applicants changes adversely, so much that the expected return from those 
receiving loans may actually decrease as the interest rate charge is increased. And there may 
be an adverse incentive effect: borrowers take riskier actions, which increases the probability 
of default."




























































































Variability of profit results between 1980-86
Net Revenue* Gross revenue**
Mean Standard Mean Standard
Error Error
Germany
The 3 Big Banks 1.24 0.29 3.85 Û42
All banks
Is the variance bigger
1.13 0.19 2.93 021
for the big banks? No Yes to a level of 0.10
United Kingdom
(Only the 5 more important
clearing banks) 1.53 0.19 4.93 026
France 
Big banks 1.29 0.22 4.05 Û49
All banks
Difference in variance
1.39 0.13 4.33 031
significant? No No
Spain
7 Big banks 1.96 0.12 5.58 034
All banks
Difference of variance
1.58 0.10 4.72 021
significant? No Yes to a level of 0.10
NB. The results are expressed in percentage of capital. * Net revenue means revenue after tax 
and ** gross revenue represents the same variable before it.
Germany: all the banks are universal; the big banks are the Deutsche Bank, the Dresdner Bank 
and the Commerzbank.
United Kingdom: the banks considered are the 5 principal London clearing banks.
France: the totality of banks includes all the mutual and commercial banks, the big banks are 
represented by the 8 biggest commercial banks.
Spain: the big banks include the 7 biggest commercial banks, 




























































































The above figures do not support the hypothesis of increased profitability. The 
three biggest German banks do not exhibit a standard error smaller for their 
surplus operations and their gross revenue (a similar situation is to be observed 
for the Spanish case; the French case shows a certain coherence as regards these 
parameters). In other words a larger size does not induce a smaller variance as 
regards profits. Even for universal banks with dominant position as regards size 
can suffer from profit fluctuations. However it is difficult to say precisely if this 
excess volatility in performance is only connected to universality given that the 
great variability of the German banks’ profits taken as a whole is not statistically 
more important than that of the other banking systems (one of the essential 
reasons for these differences being a quite low degree of freedom due to the 
small numbers of years included in the sample, the only source of data being the 
OECD).
This test raises some doubts about the superiority of performance permitted by 
a quasi perfect capacity of diversifying risks. A simple comparison of the net 
and/or gross revenues obtained for Germany or France does not exhibit very 
impressive differences in magnitude.
The preceding work suggests that the biggest establishments are not 
necessarily the most profitable. It will be interesting to add a similar study which 
begins after the concentration movement in order to take account of any effects 
this may have had. To this end the level of profit after deduction of taxes has 
been examined for the period 1989-93, which was when the principal banking 
acquisitions took place. The following countries have been taken into 
consideration: France, Germany, Italy, Spain. Unfortunately no data were 
available for the United Kingdom. Two types of establishments constitute the 
basis of our sample: all banks, and the biggest institutions with respect to size. 
As before, size is taken as relevant characteristic of the universality model. If 
this is, of course, not completely exact, it is an assumption we are bound to 
































































































The 3 biggest 3.28 0.20
All banks 2.39 0.15
Is the variance greater 
for the biggest banks ? No
Italy
The Great Banks 2.77 0.15
All banks 2.61 0.16
Is the variance greater 
for the biggest banks ? No
France
Big banks 2.28 0.13
All banks 2.58 0.14
Difference of variance 
significant ? No
Spain
7 Big banks 3.74 0.19
All Banks 4.14 0.28
Difference of variance 
significant ? No
NB. Germany: all the banks are universal; the big banks are the Deutsche Bank, the Dresdner 
Bank and the Commerzbank.
France: the totality of banks includes all the mutual and commercial banks, the big banks are 
represented by the 8 biggest commercial banks.
Spain: the big banks include the 7 biggest commercial banks, 
source OECD.
If we compare these numbers to those proposed by Steinherr and Huveneers 
(1992b), it appears that the data give no evidence of a significant difference due 
to the presence of banks that benefit from great power in the market. The 
question is then whether a move towards universality is really desirable. Put 




























































































towards the perturbations generated in countries where domestic banking 
concentration is very low (cf. the Scandinavian countries, Portugal....)
One could object that this argument is insufficient to prove that universal 
banks are more profitable than specialised banks. In order to reinforce the point 
data reported in Dermine (1993) will be used. It is often argued that large bank 
size can be of help when facing a wider integrated risky market. The table 
below shows the correlation between bank size and claims as a percentage of the 
total assets of commercial banks.
Total assets Herfindhal Estimated Claims as%
of top five banks Concentration average size of total assets
in million $ Index of all banks of commercial
in million $ banks (1)
Italy 100 3.7 1.6 21.7
France 232 10.2 2.0 4.2
Germany 165 3.3 1.5 13.5
United Kingdom 155 15.0 1.9 1.1
Belgium 64 14.8 2.2 19.3
Spain 53 9.4 0.7 7.7
Data on the top 500 banks in the world are from the Banker, July 1988. Data are for 1987 
except for the last column, where calculations have been made using information contained 
in the EEC Report (1988).
(1) Germany, 240 commercial banks; France, 435 commercial banks and credit copperatives; 
Italy, 401 commercial and savings banks; UK 660 statistical banks; Belgium, 119 banks, 
private savings banks and public credit institutions; Spain 363 banks.
Calculations are based on IMF-IFS data. ’Total assets’ are obtained as the sum of reserves, 
foreign assets and claims on the private sector, government and other financial intermediaries.
From these data it can be seen that Italy was one of the less concentrated 
countries. A large part of its activity is devoted to financing the public sector 
and it has the highest percentage of bank claims on government. If the preceding 
considerations are added to these ones, it appears that the correlation between 
size and profitability is not always positive.
In conclusion, one can support the idea that universal banks do not benefit 
from comparative advantages as important as those suggested in the majority of 




























































































shows that these banks have grown to a point at which an additional rise in size 
will generate perverse effects for all elements of the system. One can wonder 
whether the creation of counter-powers will not be necessary if the benefits of 
universal banking are to be enjoyed without suffering from the damages.
2/ Solutions proposed to control the power of universal banks.
This bring us to the problem of cooperation among the different national 
authorities. In other words is it possible to envisage the creation of a central 
institution capable of controlling economic standards?
This refers to the necessity of the creation of European Central Bank. Xavier 
Vives (1993) has summarised the functions of the European Central Bank (ECB) 
as presented in the European legislation.18 19
The tasks to be exerted by this new institution are:
1/ to preserve European stability in the payment system in conjunction 
with the control authorities,
2/ to intervene in case of liquidity problems, with the national European 
authorities (in particular national central banks) taking part in solvency 
questions.
The definition of the lender of last resort and its intervention domain remains 
obscure. Charles Goodhart states in part:
"There is no mention o f any specific objectives to sustain the health and 
effective functioning o f the banking and the financial systems among the 
objectives set out in Art 2. Moreover there is no reference to the possible 
role o f the European System o f Central Bank as a lender o f last resort to 
be found in the statute."'9
18 During 1990 the Committee of Governors o f European Central Banks prepared a 
proposal for statutes of the future European Central Bank. This document was presented to 
the Ministers of Finance of Europe on December 2nd 1990. It became public in the same 
month.
19 cf. Charles Goodhart "A European Central Bank" in A. Mullineux (Ed) European 
Banking Blackwell 1992. The article 25.2 removes all possibility to design the European 
Central Bank as a supervision organ and transfers the totality of these competencies to the 
national institutions. The proposed system is then very close to the one that exists in the 
United States, which means the separation between the institutions responsible of the monetary 




























































































In fact this Second Directive foresees supervision on the part of the home 
country as regards illiquidity and insolvency matters. In joint reference to this 
text and the European legislation it is possible to affirm that the European 
Central Bank is not the Bank of banks but an independent organ capable of 
controlling monetary stability20 (and in particular the European price level).21 
In no case does it constitute a counter-power in the face of the universal banks. 
The question is whether the national central banks will be able to assume the 
role of lender of last resort knowing that the size and needs of certain of large 
universal banks require the intervention of a comparable bank, strongly 
convinced of its functions and independence.22 What will happen when a bank, 
established in any country of Europe faces difficulties in the host country? If we 
refer to the actual legislation, the central bank of the home country will 
intervene. However repercussions regarding the liquidity of solvency problems 
will occur in the host country. This calls for a strict collaboration between the 
different central organisms. What will happen when two banks belonging to 
different countries which have only signed cooperation contracts become illiquid 
or insolvent? In this last case which will be the competent authority to 
intervene? The legislation as regards this last case is less than categorical. If two 
(or more) banks decide to cooperate outside of implicit contractual agreements, 
it seems difficult to decide which intervention organism will be the more 
adequate.
Finally, once all these problems have been resolved, what will be the 
intervention criteria? Charles Goodhart (1985) puts forward the thesis that the
20 Dr H. Tietmeyer from the Deutsche Bundesbank justified this separation between the 
role of preservation of monetary stability and the lender of last resort as followed:
"... i f  too many tasks were to be assigned to the European Central Bank this could complicate 
the conduct o f  monetary policy. The European System o f Central Bank System (ESCB) should 
be free, therefore from responsibilities other than those for monetary policy. In particular 
banking supervision should not be assigned to the ESCB, but should be left with national 
authorities, i f  only to prevent the ESCB from being forced into a "lender o f last resort" 
function that would not be compatible with its task o f safeguarding the currency... " 
Deutsche Bundesbank 1991.
21 In fact the European legislation is very similar to the situation that exists actually in the 
United States and that establishes a separation between the monetary institutions and the 
institutions of "banking supervision" cf. Charles Goodhart (1995).
22 This independence criterion is not to be neglected if we want to prevent deficit 




























































































distinction between illiquidity risk and insolvency is a myth.23 The literature 
on investment constraints supports this position. As Bemanke (1983) has shown, 
the large fall in bank liquidity may help to explain the depth and the persistence 
of the Great Depression. In this situation it becomes difficult to establish the 
frontier between illiquidity and insolvency. To this consideration, one could add 
the principle "too big to fail", more connected to a pure size criterion than to 
universality. In these conditions will it be possible for the Central Bank to 
intervene?
The problem is then to evaluate if it is really possible to control the 
predominance of the banks best placed on the market. In the affirmative case, 
how can the dangers generated by their power be prevented? No satisfactory 
response has been furnished up to now, probably because the big banks of the 
EEC members have had, until recently, the ability to protect themselves from 
illiquidity or insolvency risks. However, the history of banking failures tells us 
that it would be presumptuous to neglect the possibility of such situations even 
for the most competitive institutions and the ones most capable of diversifying 
their risks. The most urgent preoccupation could then be for European 
authorities intent on realising a single banking market to rethink the means to 
be adopted. It could be that the future European Central Bank should become 
the lender of last resort. This implies a sufficient independence towards the 
national monetary authorities which will enable it to take the necessary measures 
without suffering the influence of the individual governments. These are some 
of the institutional gaps which need to be filled in order to realize an European 
banking area.
General Conclusion
The arguments traced in this paper suggest that the advantages of 
universal banks have been overestimated and their disadvantages for the whole 
banking sector minimised. The question is then: what will be the future of 
universal banks? In order to answer this question, a correct evaluation of the 
problems is an absolute priority if the realisation of a unified banking market is 
an objective for the end of this century. Several solutions are possible. The first 
would be to pay more attention to the situation of European members. In the 
second section of this paper, the problems of the Scandinavian countries were 
mentioned. The difficulties encountered by Portugal in its development are also
23 He affirms that "Because of the difficulty of valuing [the distressed bank’s] assets, a 
Central Bank will usually have to take a decision on last resort support to meet an immediate 
liquidity problem when it knows that there is a doubt about solvency, but does not know just 




























































































of relevance; a number of banks were nationalised under the Salazar government 
and have been privatised only very recently. These institutions are much smaller 
and more specialised than those in the average European member state. Banking 
integration will require more time and more substantial change than in most 
European countries.
The last section critically evaluated the arguments in favour of the 
predominance of universal banks over any other form of institution. Jean 
Dermine (1993) insists that certain specialised banks are as competitive as 
universal establishments. The option for the future could be a more adequate 
equilibrium between banking institutions in order to preserve the potential 
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Annexe B: List of Activities included in the Second Banking Directive
1 Deposit activities and other forms of lending
2 Lending (consumption credit, mortgage credit, factoring, commercial finance)
3 Financial Leasing
4 Monetary transmission services
5 Issuing and administration of means of payments (credit cards, traveller 
checks...)
6 Guarantees and financial commitments
7 Trade for own accounts or for account of the customers in
(i) money market instruments (cheques, bills, credit deposits, etc...)
(ii) foreign exchange
(iii) financial futures and options
(iv) exchange and interest rate instruments
(v) securities
8 Participation in share issues and provisions of services relative to such issues
9 Money Broking
10 Portfolio management and advices
11 Safekeeping of securitiess
12 Credit references services




























































































Annex C: Some examples of the principal structural transformations in national 
banking systems
Belgium
- Separation between investment banks and commercial banks progressively 
relaxed.
- No direct trade of assets, participation in brokering houses progressively 
authorised.
- Banks can possess insurance companies.
- Recent despecialisation of saving banks and public credit institutions.
France
- 1984: widening range of products for mutual banks and cooperative banks. End 
of the specialisation of the banking system.
- No direct trade of assets by banks. Must be exerted by subsidiaries.
- No insurance activities for banks but the latter can possess insurance 
companies without any restrictions.
- The mutual funds must be held by subsidiaries.
Germany
- Mortgage exclusively reserved to banking mortgage and building companies.
- Leasing and Mutual funds through subsidiaries.
- No insurance activities possible but banks can possess insurance companies. 
Italy
- Specialisation significant inside the banking system. Until 1986 distinction 
between short term funds given to commercial banks (up to 18 months) and 
medium and long term funds (exerted by specific credit institutions). Very 
limited distortions to the legislation in 1986.
- May 1980 Banks are authorised to buy provisions in insurance companies. 
Spain
- Widening range of saving banks and disappearance of specialisation even 
before the 1980s.
- In 1988 relaxation of the persisting restrictions on merchant banks (leasing, 
mortgage bonds ).
- The insurance activities and the mutual funds can be exerted by subsidiaries.
- Trade of assets through subsidiaries.
Netherlands
- Functional Separation "de facto"





























































































- No investment consulting or sales of investment products after 1986 (FSA)
- 1986: Capital trade is allowed (100% of property for members of stock 
markets)
- 1986: The property societies are authorised to take risky loans and to grant 
credit cards.
- No restriction relative to the private property of insurance companies by banks.




























































































Annex D: Domestic and infra EEC concentration
A. Principal domestic concentrations
Source - Lafferty Group, Financial Revolution in Europe, February 1990 et 
European Banker, April 1990
- The Banker, Top 1000, July 1990
- ABB, Les banques au sein du secteur financier en 1988, October 1989
- Annual Reports of the Belgian banks and savings banks
- Financial Times December 1992
- The Banker 22 October 1995
Country Institutions Nature of the operation
Spain
- Banco de Vizcaya & Banco de Bilbao (1988) Merger
- Caja de Barcelona & la Caixa de Pensions (1989) Merger
- Banco Hispano Americano & Banco Central (1991) Merger
- Banco Exterior, Credito Industrial & Credito
Agricola (1992) Merger
Danmark
- Copenhagen Handelsbank, Den Danske Bank & Merger
Provinsbanken
- Privatbanken, Sparekassen SDS & Andelsbanken Merger
- Sydbank & Sparelassen Sydiylland Merger
Sweden
- PK Banken & Nordbanken (1989) Merger
- Svenska Handelsbanken & Skanska Banken (1989) Svenska
adquired Skanska
- PK Banken Nordbanken &Gotabank (1990) Merger
Netherlands
- Algemene Bank Nederland (ABN) & Amsterdam Merger 
Rotterdam Bank (Amro) (1990)
- NMB & Postdam (1989) Merger
Germany
- Landesbank Stuttgart & Badische Kommunale Merger
Landesbank (1988)
- Landesbank Berlin,Berliner Bank & Berliner Hypo (1994)Merger
Norway
- Den Norske Creditbank et Berger Bank (1989) Merger





























































































- Alliance and Leicester et Girobank (1989) Alliance adquired
Girobank
- HSCB and Midland (1992) Merger
Italy
- Cassa di Risparmio di Roma (CRR) et Banco di Santo Acquisition 
Spirito (BSS) (1989)
- Banca Commerciale Italiana (BCI) et Credito Italiano (1990) Acquisition
- Banco Commerciale Italiana et Banca Sicula (1990) Acquisition
- Banco Ambrosiano Veneto et Citibank Italia (1990) Acquisition
- Cassa di Risparmio de Rome et Banco di Roma ( 1990) Acquisition
- Institute Bancario San Paolo di Torino et Crediop (1991)Acquisition
Belgium
- Bank voor Handelskrediet et Gesbank Acquisition
- Tiense Bank et Metropolitan Bank Acquisition
- Spaarbank Ippa et Bank Ippa Merger
- AGF Spaarbank et Softbank Acquisition
- Banque DrCtze et BAC Acquisition
- Spaarbank Unispar et Paribas Bank BelgiS Acquisition
B. Principal Mergers and acquisitions infra-community
Target Country Year Initiator Target
Spain 1989 National Westminster bank (GB) Banco Nacional West 
March
1989 Deutsche Bank (D) Banco Trans
1990 Crédit Lyonnais (F) Banco Commercial Espanol
1990 Crédit Lyonnais (F) Iberagentes
1991 Crédit Lyonnais (F) Banco Jover
1991 Institute Bancario San Paolo di 
Torino (I)
Banca Catala de Credit
United 1989 Deutsche Bank (D) Morgan Grenfell
Kingdom 1990 NAB Yorshire Bank
1990 Banco Popolare Novara (I) SFE Bank
France 1988 BNP (F) Chemical Bank’s mortgage 
subsidiary
1989 Bank Brussel Lambert (B) Banque Dreyfus
1990 Barclays Bank (GB) L’Européene de Crédit
Italy 1989 Crédit Lyonnais (F) Credito Bergamo




























































































Portugal 1990 Royal Bank of Scotland (GB)
1990 Banco Santander (E)
Belgium 1989 Banque Régionale d’Escompte et 
de Dépôts (F)
1989 Westdeutsche Landesbank (D)
Germany 1990 Barclays Bank PLC (GB)
1995 Lloyds (GB)
Netherlands 1988 Crédit Lyonnais (F)
1990 National Westminster Bank (GB)
Source : Financial Times 1992 and the Banker October 1995
Banco de Commercio 
e Industria
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